1) The Creditor and AB, the parent company of the Creditor, unjustly mistreated the Debtors compared to idol groups belonging to other affiliates under AB. Despite the Debtors’ repeated requests to the Creditor to take appropriate measures regarding the unfair treatment experienced by the Debtors, the Creditor failed to respond. In particular, although AD was a key figure who led and oversaw management operations and was a core premise of the Exclusive Contract in this Case, AB conducted an unjust audit against AD, and the Creditor dismissed AD from the position of Representative Director. This has irreparably destroyed the relationship of trust between the Creditor and the Debtors, which formed the foundation of the Exclusive Contract in this Case. Nevertheless, compelling entertainers, namely the Debtors, to perform exclusive activities against their free will would result in excessive infringement of the entertainers’ personal rights. Therefore, pursuant to the legal principles established in Supreme Court Decision 2017Da258237, dated September 10, 2019 (hereinafter referred to as the “aforementioned Supreme Court Decision”),^{Footnote 3} the Exclusive Contract in this Case was lawfully terminated by the Debtors’ expression of intent. Accordingly, the right to be preserved in this application does not exist.

2) Even if this application were rejected and the Debtors were permitted to engage in independent entertainment activities, the damage suffered by the Creditor would be merely monetary damages consisting of the loss of revenue from the Debtors’ entertainment activities. On the other hand, if this application is granted, the Debtors will suffer irreparable harm due to a prolonged hiatus. Furthermore, if this application is granted, the Debtors will be unable to engage in independent entertainment activities without going through the Creditor, thereby suffering significant infringement of their freedom to pursue their profession or freedom of artistic creation. Therefore, there is no necessity of preservation to prohibit the Debtors’ independent entertainment activities through this application before the conclusion of deliberations in the main lawsuit seeking confirmation of the validity of the exclusive contract.

1) Regarding the Premise or Foundation of the Exclusive Contract in this Case

A) An “exclusive management contract” is a contract whose main content consists of an agency or manager providing services related to the handling of an entertainer’s entertainment business, while the entertainer bears the obligation to engage in entertainment activities only through the agency or manager and not to engage in entertainment activities directly or through third parties. The legal nature of such contract must be determined by specifically examining various circumstances, including the purpose of the contract, the content and nature of the obligations borne by the parties, the parties’ status, level of recognition, differences in bargaining power, and the method of payment or distribution of revenue (see the aforementioned Supreme Court Decision). Therefore, to properly understand the legal nature of the Exclusive Contract in this Case, which governs the rights and obligations between the Creditor and the Debtors, it is necessary to specifically examine the underlying premise or foundational circumstances, particularly the status and role of AB and AD, which the Debtors have raised as issues.

B) According to the record, the following series of premises or foundational circumstances related to the Exclusive Contract in this Case can be ascertained:

① Originally, the Debtors were trainees under AC with the designation “AX.” AC entered into a trainee contract with Debtor AM starting on November 23, 2018, followed by contracts with Debtor L on November 23, 2019, Debtor N on February 3, 2020, Debtor M on July 16, 2020, and Debtor Q on January 19, 2021. In particular, Debtor AM had already been selected before AD even joined AB, and there is no objective evidence that AD was directly involved in the process by which the remaining Debtors were selected as AC’s “AX.”

② Subsequently, on November 2, 2021, the “AX” division of AC was spun off and the Creditor (with capital of 100 million KRW) was established. On the same day, AD was appointed as the Representative Director of the Creditor. In this process, AB acquired 100% of the Creditor’s shares from AC for 5 billion KRW.

③ On November 11, 2021, AB, the Creditor, and AD (three parties) entered into a business agreement that provided for, among other things, AD’s stock purchase option for shares of the Creditor. The following day, AB entered into the BU Contract in this Case with the Creditor to support the Creditor, and on November 17, 2021, AB made an additional investment of 10 billion KRW, increasing the Creditor’s capital from 100 million KRW to 10.1 billion KRW.

④ On April 21, 2022, the Creditor and the Debtors entered into the Exclusive Contract in this Case with a contract term of 7 years. On July 6 of the same year, AB made an additional investment of 6 billion KRW, increasing the Creditor’s capital to 16.1 billion KRW. The Debtors debuted as the idol group X and released their first album on August 1, 2022, achieving unprecedented success. The Exclusive Contract in this Case does not contain a so-called “keyman clause”^{Footnote 4} that explicitly states the entertainer’s intention to establish a working relationship with a specific manager of the management company regarding AD’s role.

⑤ On March 27, 2023, AB, the Creditor, and AD (three parties) entered into a Shareholders’ Agreement with a term of 5 years, along with a share purchase agreement under which AB would transfer 20% of the Creditor’s shares to AD’s side. However, from around December 2023, AD became dissatisfied with the terms of the Shareholders’ Agreement and demanded modifications thereto. At the same time, AD sought ways to leave AB’s sphere of control with X, or to pressure AB into selling its issued shares in the Creditor, thereby weakening AB’s control over the Creditor and enabling AD to independently control the Creditor.^{Footnote 5}

C) In light of the aforementioned premises or foundational circumstances—particularly the absence of evidence that AD was directly involved in the selection of the Debtors, the fact that the official period during which AD was involved until X’s debut (from November 2, 2021 to August 1, 2022) was not particularly long, the fact that although AD directly entered into the Exclusive Contract in this Case with the Debtors as the Creditor’s Representative Director, the Exclusive Contract in this Case does not contain a so-called “keyman clause” regarding his management role, and the fact that the term of the Shareholders’ Agreement between AB and AD, etc. is 5 years, which does not coincide with the 7-year term of the Exclusive Contract in this Case—it is difficult to accept the Debtors’ argument that AD was the essential premise of the Exclusive Contract in this Case.

D) Rather, considering that AB properly recognized the Debtors who belonged to AC and established the Creditor, a company solely for the Debtors, through the spin-off of AC; that it was AB who arranged to enter into a separate contract with AD and have him support the Debtors in this process; that it was AB who unilaterally invested such substantial amounts for the Debtors and provided the Debtors with AB’s tangible and intangible resources through the BU Contract in this Case, which was possible because AB was a major entertainment agency—in light of these factors, it is appropriate to view AB as the core of the premise or foundation of the Exclusive Contract in this Case, having overseen the entire series of processes before and after the Exclusive Contract in this Case and integrating the Creditor, AD, and the Debtors as a whole to achieve significant results. AD is merely in a position of currently destroying the foundation of this integrated structure.

2) Regarding the Special Characteristics of the Exclusive Contract in this Case

A) Article 15, Paragraph 1 of the Exclusive Contract in this Case provides that “the Exclusive Contract in this Case may be terminated or rescinded if a party breaches a material obligation under the contract.” Paragraph 2 provides that “both parties understand and acknowledge that the Creditor has invested substantial time and considerable costs for the Debtors’ entertainment activities, that the contract term was determined in consideration of such investment costs and period, and that, in light of previous cases of exclusive contract breaches, if the Debtors fail to observe the contract term and unilaterally breach the contract, the Creditor may suffer significant and irreparable damage, including the complete inability to recover investment costs during the remaining contract term.” Furthermore, it provides that “if the Debtors unilaterally breach the Exclusive Contract in this Case during the contract term or breach material provisions of the contract with the purpose of unilaterally breaching it, the Debtors shall pay to the Creditor, in addition to damages, a penalty calculated by multiplying the average monthly revenue during the period when actual revenue was generated within the two years immediately preceding the contract termination date by the number of months remaining in the contract term.”

B) Due to the nature of idol group entertainment activities, the Creditor’s substantial investment, support, education, and training were necessary for the Debtors’ debut, and such investment by the Creditor only comes to fruition through the Debtors’ recognition, reputation, and entertainment activities after their debut. If the Debtors arbitrarily leave the Exclusive Contract in this Case and engage in independent entertainment activities, the Creditor would suffer the serious disadvantage of losing all its investment results, while the Debtors would be able to completely exclude the Creditor and effectively monopolize all the fruits of future entertainment activities—an unreasonable outcome.

C) Accordingly, the Exclusive Contract in this Case limits the grounds for termination to “cases where a party breaches a material obligation under the Exclusive Contract in this Case” and provides for the payment of substantial penalties in addition to damages to the Creditor if the Debtors arbitrarily terminate the contract. Beyond including provisions to secure the binding force of the contract, the parties specifically incorporated into the content of the Exclusive Contract in this Case an agreement reflecting their mutual understanding and acknowledgment regarding the unique characteristics of the process of nurturing idol groups through major entertainment agencies, explicitly including in Article 15, Paragraph 2 of the Exclusive Contract in this Case the statement that “the parties understand and acknowledge that the Creditor has invested substantial costs for the Debtors’ entertainment activities, and that if the Debtors arbitrarily breach the Exclusive Contract in this Case, the Creditor may suffer significant and irreparable damage.” The fact that the parties not only included provisions to secure the binding force of the contract in the Exclusive Contract in this Case but also incorporated into the contract the very motivation or circumstances that led them to specifically agree on the binding force of the contract, and explicitly stated this in the contract provisions, is a unique form rarely found in ordinary exclusive contracts. This reflects the aforementioned premises or foundational circumstances, and therefore the parties’ intent regarding “the binding force of the Exclusive Contract in this Case” must be respected to the maximum extent. Therefore, during the contract term of the Exclusive Contract in this Case, unless the Creditor has breached a material obligation under the Exclusive Contract in this Case or the relationship of trust between the Creditor and the Debtors, which forms the foundation of the Exclusive Contract in this Case, has been irreparably destroyed, the Debtors cannot unilaterally breach the contract or arbitrarily withdraw from the contractual relationship based solely on their subjective circumstances.

D) The Debtors argue to the effect that since they signed a contract unilaterally prepared by the Creditor, it is difficult to conclude that they were well aware of the content of Article 15, Paragraph 2, particularly the fact that the Creditor may suffer significant and irreparable damage if the Debtors unilaterally breach the Exclusive Contract in this Case.^{Footnote 6}

However, in light of the specific circumstances of how the Exclusive Contract in this Case was entered into as examined above, this argument cannot be accepted on its own.

E) The Debtors argue, citing the aforementioned Supreme Court Decision, that in exclusive contracts concerning entertainment activities, there is no need for the mutual trust relationship between the parties to be destroyed in order to terminate the contract, and that the contract should be interpreted more leniently such that either party may terminate the contract if the mutual trust between the parties has merely been impaired.

However, the Exclusive Contract in this Case contains provisions strengthening the binding force of the contract in consideration of the Creditor’s substantial investment and support for the Debtors’ debut, and the motivation or circumstances that led the parties to so agree are specifically indicated in Article 15, Paragraph 2. The case underlying the aforementioned Supreme Court Decision^{Footnote 7} did not involve such circumstances, and therefore the specific facts of the aforementioned Supreme Court Decision’s case or the outcome in which the entertainer prevailed cannot be directly applied to this case. Moreover, unlike the case underlying the aforementioned Supreme Court Decision, it is difficult to find grounds for concluding that the trust relationship between the parties has been impaired in the Exclusive Contract in this Case. Even under the legal principles of the aforementioned Supreme Court Decision, a party cannot unilaterally breach an exclusive contract based solely on subjective circumstances when the trust relationship between the parties, which formed the foundation of the exclusive contract, has not been impaired. This argument is without merit.

F) The Debtors also argue to the effect that Article 15, Paragraph 2 of the Exclusive Contract in this Case, which strengthens the binding force of the contract unlike ordinary exclusive contracts for entertainment activities, constitutes a provision that excludes or restricts the customer’s right to terminate under the law, or constitutes a provision unreasonably disadvantageous to the customer, and is therefore void under Articles 6 and 9 of the Act on the Regulation of Terms and Conditions (hereinafter the “Terms and Conditions Act”), and Articles 103 and 104 of the Civil Act.

However, the Creditor and the Debtors entered into the contract in this case after going through a negotiation process regarding the individual provisions of the Exclusive Contract in this Case (see Creditor’s Exhibits Nos. 75 and 76). Therefore, it is difficult to view that the Exclusive Contract in this Case constitutes “terms and conditions” subject to regulation under the Terms and Conditions Act (see Supreme Court Decision 2013Da214864, dated June 12, 2014, etc.). Even assuming that the Exclusive Contract in this Case constitutes “terms and conditions,” considering the following circumstances: the Debtors acknowledged and understood that the Creditor had made substantial efforts and investments for the Debtors’ debut and entertainment activities and agreed to incorporate into the contract provisions intended to maintain the Exclusive Contract in this Case for at least 7 years after the Debtors’ debut; and even under Article 15 of the Exclusive Contract in this Case, the Debtors may terminate the Exclusive Contract in this Case if the Creditor breaches a material obligation under the Exclusive Contract in this Case, meaning that the said provision does not exclude the Debtors’ exercise of their right to rescind or terminate—considering all these circumstances, Article 15, Paragraph 2 of the Exclusive Contract in this Case cannot be deemed void for violating Articles 6 or 9 of the Terms and Conditions Act, or Articles 103 or 104 of the Civil Act. This argument is also without merit.

3) Regarding Grounds for Destruction Related to AD

A) The Debtors were selected as trainees under AC, and it does not appear that AD was directly involved in their selection. During the process of negotiating the detailed terms of the Exclusive Contract in this Case between the Creditor’s side and the Debtors, there was no mention whatsoever of matters such as AD being required to exclusively handle the Debtors’ producing (see Creditor’s Exhibits Nos. 75 and 76). Nowhere in the Exclusive Contract in this Case does it state that AD must serve as the Creditor’s Representative Director or that AD must oversee the Debtors’ producing.

B) It is true that although AB proposed to AD the producing of a new girl group and AD thereby came to serve as Representative Director of the newly established Creditor for a period of 5 years, AD was dismissed from the position of Representative Director of the Creditor before 5 years had elapsed from the date of the Creditor’s establishment. However, as noted above, from around December 2023, AD became dissatisfied with the terms of the Shareholders’ Agreement with AB and demanded modifications thereto. At the same time, AD sought ways to leave AB’s sphere of control with X, or to pressure AB into selling its issued shares in the Creditor, thereby weakening AB’s control over the Creditor and enabling AD to independently control the Creditor, thus destroying the foundation of the integrated structure. Therefore, these circumstances were self-inflicted by AD.

C) Moreover, the parties to the Exclusive Contract in this Case are “the Creditor, an entertainment agency, and the Debtors, the entertainers.” Therefore, “AB’s measures against AD” cannot be equated with “the Creditor’s measures against the Debtors.” That is, AB’s detection of indications that AD was attempting to seize control of the Creditor, AB’s conduct of an audit of the Creditor (of which AD was then serving as Representative Director) around April 20, 2024, and AB’s dismissal of AD from the position of Representative Director of the Creditor around August 27, 2024 are circumstances arising from the “conflict between AB and AD” over management rights of the Creditor, etc. This cannot be viewed as destroying “the trust relationship between the Creditor and the Debtors” on which the Exclusive Contract in this Case was based.

D) Furthermore, from immediately after AD was dismissed from the position of Representative Director of the Creditor, the Creditor repeatedly proposed to AD that he handle the Debtors’ producing until the end date of the Exclusive Contract in this Case (see Creditor’s Exhibits Nos. 77, 78, and 83; Debtor’s Exhibit No. 332). AD was also re-elected as an inside director of the Creditor at the shareholders’ meeting on October 17, 2024 (see Creditor’s Exhibit No. 188). Nevertheless, AD rejected all of the Creditor’s proposals and resigned from the position of inside director of the Creditor on or around November 20, 2024. Even after negotiations between the Creditor and AD broke down, the Creditor actively sought new producers to handle the Debtors’ producing, and some producers specifically expressed to the Creditor their willingness to handle the Debtors’ producing.

If it were established that the Creditor had abandoned its producing obligations toward the Debtors, there might be room for the Debtors to terminate the Exclusive Contract in this Case. However, in this case, it has not been shown that the Creditor abandoned its producing obligations toward the Debtors. In a situation where AD is rejecting the Creditor’s above-described producing proposals, the fact that the Debtors insist solely on AD despite the Creditor’s active efforts to secure producers for the Debtors cannot be viewed as destroying “the trust relationship between the Creditor and the Debtors.”^{Footnote 8}

E) The Debtors also argue to the effect that AD’s inability to handle the Debtors’ producing constitutes a material “change of circumstances” related to the Exclusive Contract in this Case, and therefore the Debtors may terminate the Exclusive Contract in this Case.

Upon review, where the circumstances that formed the foundation for the formation of a contract have materially changed, the parties could not have foreseen this at the time of formation of the contract, and as a result, maintaining the contract as is would cause significant imbalance in the interests of the parties or make it impossible to achieve the purpose of entering into the contract, the contract may be rescinded or terminated on grounds of changed circumstances as an exception to the principle of pacta sunt servanda (see Supreme Court Decision 2016Da249557, dated June 8, 2017, etc.). The “circumstances” referred to here mean the objective circumstances that formed the foundation of the contract, not the subjective or personal circumstances of one party (see Supreme Court Decision 2004Da31302, dated March 29, 2007, etc.).

Considering that the doctrine of changed circumstances pursues purposive appropriateness and constitutes an exception to the principle of pacta sunt servanda, which pursues legal stability, based on the principle of good faith; that while AD may be considered an objective circumstance that formed the foundation for the formation of the Exclusive Contract in this Case, it is difficult to view his role, etc. as the essential premise of the Exclusive Contract in this Case; and particularly that in the current situation where AD is intentionally destroying the integrated structure that formed the premise of the Exclusive Contract in this Case as noted above, the Debtors’ alignment with AD’s position cannot possibly be viewed as an unforeseeable change in the objective circumstances that formed the foundation for the formation of the Exclusive Contract in this Case (rather, such argument by the Debtors appears to be contrary to the principle of good faith, which is the basis of the doctrine of changed circumstances); and that the remaining circumstances raised by the Debtors are mostly close to subjective circumstances as discussed below; and that even taking all of these into account, recognizing the binding force as provided in the Exclusive Contract in this Case cannot be viewed as causing significant imbalance in the interests of the parties or making it impossible to achieve the purpose of entering into the contract—in light of all these factors, the doctrine of changed circumstances should not be applied in this case.

4) Regarding the Remaining Grounds for Destruction

A) The Debtors argue that the trust relationship between the Creditor and the Debtors was destroyed because: some members of AH, an idol group under AK, another affiliate under AB, encountered Debtor L but did not greet her; the manager of AH passed by Debtor L and said to the AH members “(referring to Debtor L) ignore her”; and AV, a PR staff member of AB, disparaged the Debtors’ achievements and made statements such as “the Debtors may be being manipulated by AD,” yet the Creditor failed to take appropriate action.

However, it is difficult to conclude that “the trust relationship between the Creditor and the Debtors,” which forms the foundation of the Exclusive Contract in this Case, was destroyed merely because AH members, who are juniors to the Debtors’ idol group, passed by Debtor L without properly greeting her,^{Footnote 9} or because a PR staff member of AB, the Creditor’s parent company, made statements in a telephone conversation with a newspaper reporter to the effect that “X’s album sales are not as high as expected,” or “it is suspected that AD’s instructions may be behind X’s attempt to leave the Creditor.”

Rather, considering that: the materials submitted to date do not establish that the AH members intentionally ignored Debtor L or that the AH manager made such statements; regarding the “ignore her” incident, the Creditor requested AK, the agency to which AH belongs, to conduct interviews with the AH manager, etc. around September 24, 2024 (see Creditor’s Exhibit No. 105); around September 25, 2024 and October 8, 2024, the Creditor explained to the Debtors that “although [the Creditor] is making continuous efforts to resolve the incident, it is deemed inappropriate to engage in active confrontation with AK while the facts have not been clearly confirmed, and therefore [the Creditor] will first take measures to minimize the Debtors’ contact with other artists and ensure that the management team always accompanies them” (see Creditor’s Exhibit No. 101; Debtor’s Exhibit No. 124); around November 27, 2024, the Creditor issued a statement in its name advocating the Debtors’ position (see Debtor’s Exhibit No. 126); regarding the “AB PR staff statement” incident, the Creditor immediately protested to AB upon learning of the statement (see Creditor’s Exhibits Nos. 111, 114, and 117) and received from AB a promise of preventive measures including employee education and exclusion of the staff member in question from X’s PR (see Creditor’s Exhibits Nos. 112 and 118); the Creditor also considered filing criminal complaints or charges against AB’s failure to preserve CCTV footage related to the “ignore her” incident and the AB PR staff member’s statements, but based on legal counsel from a law firm that such complaints or charges would likely be highly ineffective (see Creditor’s Exhibit No. 107), and considering the potential impact on the reputation or fame of the Debtors as entertainers if the Creditor, their agency, were to proceed with criminal complaints or charges, [the Creditor] appears not to have proceeded with such complaints or charges—considering all these circumstances, the Creditor can be viewed as having taken the best possible measures at the time to protect the Debtors regarding each of the above incidents.

B) The Debtors also argue that the trust relationship between the Creditor and the Debtors was destroyed because AH, under AK, copied X’s “concept” and videos from the Debtors’ trainee days were released through AF, yet the Creditor failed to take appropriate action.

However, it is difficult to see that AH’s copying of X’s “concept” or AF’s release of videos from the Debtors’ trainee days is directly related to “the trust relationship between the Creditor and the Debtors” on which the Exclusive Contract in this Case was based. Furthermore, considering that: the materials submitted to date make it difficult to conclusively determine that AH comprehensively copied X’s “concept”; the Creditor (with AD then serving as Representative Director) advocated the Debtors’ position and protested to AB and AK through emails and press conferences regarding AH’s copying of X’s “concept” (see Debtor’s Exhibit No. 63); even after the change of Representative Director, the Creditor requested AB around November 25, 2024 to delete and refrain from sharing materials related to X’s planning proposal (see Creditor’s Exhibit No. 73); the Creditor also considered pursuing damages claims against AK or filing criminal complaints or charges, but appears to have deferred such measures against AK out of consideration that taking such measures while the issue of plagiarism had not been clearly confirmed could rather interfere with or harm the Debtors’ activities or reputation (see Creditor’s Exhibit No. 71); regarding the leak of videos from the Debtors’ trainee days, the Creditor protested to AC (see Creditor’s Exhibit No. 128-1) and requested AF through numerous emails, etc. to delete the videos (see Creditor’s Exhibits Nos. 123, 125, and 126; Creditor’s Exhibit No. 128-2), and also entered into a separate service contract with a law firm to completely delete the videos circulated online (see Creditor’s Exhibits Nos. 129 and 130)—considering all these circumstances, the Creditor can be viewed as having taken the best possible measures at the time to protect the Debtors regarding each of the above incidents.

C) The Debtors also argue to the effect that the Creditor damaged the trust relationship between the Creditor and the Debtors by publicly making statements disparaging the Debtors at the hearing held on March 7, 2025 in the first instance of this case.

However, the Creditor filed this application to prohibit the Debtors from engaging in entertainment activities in violation of the Exclusive Contract in this Case until the conclusion of deliberations in the main lawsuit in this case, and made statements at the hearing to the effect that “at present, the entertainers, the Debtors, are in a superior position (the so-called ‘갑’ position) compared to the entertainment agency, the Creditor” or “it is not clearly confirmed whether the AH members ignored Debtor L and passed by her” merely to demonstrate that the grounds for termination alleged by the Debtors do not exist. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that the trust relationship between the Creditor and the Debtors, which forms the foundation of the Exclusive Contract in this Case, was destroyed by the Creditor’s statements at the hearing.

D) In addition, as stated in the reasons of the Provisional Disposition Decision in this Case cited by the first instance decision, the remaining grounds raised by the Debtors also cannot be viewed as circumstances that cause destruction of the trust relationship.

5) Regarding Whether the “Trust Relationship” Has Been Destroyed

A) The dictionary definition of “trust (信賴)” is “to firmly believe in and rely upon.” This refers to the expectation and belief regarding the possibility that another person’s future actions will be favorable or at least not malicious toward oneself. The structure of trust presupposes uncertainty of information and imperfection of monitoring. The legal requirement of “destruction of trust relationship” is an objective fact of a “destroyed state,” not the subjective or personal circumstances or thoughts of one party, and certainly not a hope for destruction or an intent or desire to cause destruction.

B) The Creditor, as the management company for the Debtors, is reviewing various plans related to the Debtors’ entertainment activities, including domestic fan meetings in 2025 (see Creditor’s Exhibits Nos. 254 and 360-365, etc.), and continues to propose meetings with the Debtors to discuss the Debtors’ future entertainment activity plans, etc. However, the Debtors are refusing to communicate with the Creditor (see Creditor’s Exhibit No. 289). Despite the Creditor’s efforts to faithfully perform its obligations as the Debtors’ management company, the mere fact that the Debtors claim destruction of the trust relationship, citing reasons such as demanding the return of a specific producer or expressing disappointment with the Creditor, does not establish the objective fact of a destroyed state.

C) Behind the Debtors’ success were the substantial efforts and dedication of the Creditor’s executives and employees and various other stakeholders (see Creditor’s Exhibits Nos. 235, 256, and 356; Debtor’s Exhibit No. 46). The Debtors themselves understood and acknowledged that many people’s efforts and support went into X’s debut, and through Article 15 of the Exclusive Contract in this Case, agreed not to arbitrarily breach the contract during the period the Exclusive Contract in this Case remains in effect. The Debtors may have experienced feelings of loss or deprivation because they believe they can no longer work with a specific producer or feel they have received discriminatory treatment compared to other idol groups. However, observing the Exclusive Contract in this Case is a natural obligation of the Debtors as contracting parties, and the mere fact that the Debtors claim destruction of the trust relationship citing such reasons does not establish the objective fact of a destroyed state.

6) Sub-Conclusion

1) Regarding the Balance of Interests

A) As examined above, the nurturing of idol groups through major entertainment agencies requires the agency’s full investment, support, education, and training before the entertainers debut, and the results of such investment are realized through the individual or group’s recognition, reputation, and image as entertainers. If the Debtors arbitrarily leave the Exclusive Contract in this Case and engage in independent entertainment activities, the Debtors would be able to completely exclude the Creditor and effectively monopolize all the fruits of entertainment activities, while the Creditor would suffer the serious disadvantage of losing all its investment results.

B) In conducting entertainment activities, the public’s perception and externally projected image serve as considerably important factors. The Debtors held an overseas concert in Hong Kong around March 23, 2025, using the name “AG” rather than X, while excluding the Creditor (see Creditor’s Exhibits Nos. 316, 318, and 320). If a situation where the Debtors engage in independent entertainment activities is left unaddressed, there is concern that the public may form the mistaken perception that the Exclusive Contract in this Case has been completely terminated, and there is significant potential for serious damage to the brand image of X.

C) The Creditor’s executives and employees appear to have made continuous efforts for the Debtors’ success (see Creditor’s Exhibits Nos. 235, 256, and 356; Debtor’s Exhibit No. 46). The Debtors appear to be virtually the only idol group currently under the Creditor, and the proportion of the Debtors’ entertainment activities in the Creditor’s revenue and operating profit is overwhelming. A significant number of executives and employees are currently employed at the Creditor (see Creditor’s Exhibit No. 93). If the Debtors arbitrarily leave the Creditor and continue independent entertainment activities, the Creditor will face a crisis that endangers its very existence, and numerous stakeholders related to X are expected to suffer significant damage.

D) The Debtors argue that if this application is granted, they will suffer irreparable harm due to a prolonged hiatus. However, this would occur as a result of the Debtors’ refusal to perform the valid Exclusive Contract in this Case and merely constitutes self-inflicted damage. Rather, the Creditor will suffer damage as a result. In particular, the Debtors argue that they successfully completed overseas performances without receiving the Creditor’s management services,^{Footnote 10} yet there is no reason why such Debtors could not perform while receiving the Creditor’s management services.

2) Regarding Infringement of Freedom to Pursue Profession or Freedom of Artistic Creation

A) Through this application, the Creditor seeks “confirmation that the Creditor holds the status of the Debtors’ management company, and that the Debtors shall not engage in entertainment activities without the Creditor’s prior approval or consent.” Even if this application is granted, the Debtors may engage in entertainment activities while observing the Exclusive Contract in this Case, and the Debtors’ freedom to pursue their profession or freedom of artistic creation is not being deprived.

B) The Debtors are parties to the Exclusive Contract in this Case, and observing the Exclusive Contract in this Case is a natural obligation of the Debtors. Requiring the Debtors to engage in entertainment activities in a manner that observes the Exclusive Contract in this Case until the completion of deliberations in the main lawsuit seeking confirmation of the validity of the exclusive contract in this case cannot be viewed as infringing the Debtors’ freedom to pursue their profession or freedom of artistic creation.

C) The Creditor appears to be preparing various entertainment activity plans for the Debtors and has promised full support for the Debtors’ entertainment activities.^{Footnote 11} The Debtors are virtually the only idol group under the Creditor, and the Debtors’ success as entertainers is directly connected to the Creditor’s success. Therefore, there does not appear to be significant concern that the Creditor would unreasonably interfere with the Debtors’ entertainment activities. There is also an aspect in which continuing entertainment activities in a direction that observes the Exclusive Contract in this Case would rather be beneficial to the Debtors.

3) Sub-Conclusion